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Abstract
When a takeover is announced, the sum of the stock-market values of the
ﬁrms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does.
Does this mean that takeovers do not raise the values of the ﬁrms involved? Not
necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of takeovers
is constrained eﬃcient. Yet, upon news of a takeover, a target’s price rises,
the bidder’s price falls, and, most of the time the joint value of the target and
acquirer also falls.
1 Introduction
On news of a takeover, the share price of the target ﬁrm usually rises sharply, while
that of the acquiring ﬁrm usually falls. The joint value may or may not rise. Surveying
the ﬁeld, Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001) report that since 1973 target premia
were 20 or 30 percent, acquirer discounts were minus 3 or 4 percent, and that the joint
v a l u es h o w sn oc l e a rp a t t e r n . T h e yc o n c l u d e( p . 1 1 8 )t h a t“ t h ef a c tt h a tm e r g e r s
do not seem to beneﬁt acquirers provides a reason to worry ...[that mergers do not
raise value].” To explain such evidence (Shleifer and Vishny 2001) have assumed that
investors are irrational and (Roll 1986) has assumed that managers use takeovers
to extend their empires at the expense of the shareholder. The evidence about the
bidder discount and joint discount has been taken to imply that takeovers often just
redistribute rents from acquirers to their targets or that they even destroy rents.
We show, however, that even when investors are rational, when agency problems
are absent, and when mergers do create value, the acquirer’s value and even the joint
value of the bidder and target may fall when a takeover is announced. The bidding
ﬁrm’s value falls because its bid reveals that its internal investment opportunities are
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1poor. The target’s value rises because an acquisition signals that the target’s internal
investment opportunities are good. A takeover beneﬁts both parties, and the number
of takeovers is, in a sense, constrained-eﬃcient. And yet the bidder discount usually
outweighs the target premium so that the joint value drops.
We discuss other related work later on in the paper; the highlights there are
Holmes and Schmitz (1990, 1995), Campa and Kedia (forthcoming), Villalonga (2001),
Gort, Grabowski, and McGuckin (1985), and Myers and Majluf (1984). But ﬁrst we
present the model and then discuss its robustness.
2M o d e l
I nt h em o d e lt h a tw ea r ea b o u tt od e s c r i b e ,t a k e o v e r sa r et h em e c h a n i s mt h a tm o v e s
good projects from bad managers to good managers. At the outset ﬁrms diﬀer in the
quality, x,o ft h e i rm a n a g e m e n t . 1 Each ﬁrm then draws a project and the quality, z,
o fp r o j e c t s ,t o o ,d i ﬀers over ﬁrms. Some good managers end up with bad projects
and vice versa. Takeovers then serve to shift the good projects from bad managers
to good managers. A ﬁrm’s output is
xz. (1)
Thus the quality of a project, z,a n dt h eﬁrm’s ability to implement a project, x,
are complements. Among ﬁrms, x ≥ 0 is distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function F (x). Projects are either good or useless: z ∈ {0,1}.Af r a c t i o n
λ of projects is good, and the fraction 1 − λ is useless.
A ﬁrm cannot change the quality of its management. It can, however, acquire
another ﬁrm and manage its project. A manager can handle only one project. If a
ﬁrm (x,z) buys ﬁrm (x0,z0), it then uses its own management, x, and the project,
z0,o ft h eﬁrm that it has acquired. It drops its own, useless project, and lets go the
manager of the target. The output of the merged entity will be2
xz
0. (2)
To an acquirer, then, only the target’s z0 matters. The departing manager receives
no severance payment and does not stand in the way of the takeover as long as it
1Andrade et al (2001) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) report evidence that acquisitions are
disproportionately made by high-Q ﬁrms.
2This partially reﬂects ﬁndings by McGuckin and Ngyen (1995) and Schoar (2000) that the
productivity of the target’s plants rises (in this case from x0 to x) while that of the acquirer’s plants
falls (in this case from z to zero as the plant is ‘abandoned’). We re-visit this issue in Section 4. The
merged ﬁrm produces more output than the combined stand-alone outputs of the two ﬁrms. Hence,
productivity rises after a merger. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) ﬁnd that plants changing owners
had lower initial levels of productivity and higher subsequent productivity growth than plants that
did not change hands.
2beneﬁts the shareholders of his ﬁrm. We assume that all mergers are driven only by
the prospect of real gain, all investors are rational and all managers act only in the
long-term interests of shareholders. This is not to suggest that, empirically, mergers
a r ea l w a y se x a c t l yl i k et h a t .R a t h e r ,w ea s s u m et h a ta l lm e r g e r sc r e a t ev a l u e ,t h a t
the stock market is eﬃcient, and that there is no agency problem, in order to see
exactly where these extreme assumptions lead.
2.1 A sketch of equilibrium
We begin with an intuitive derivation of the equilibrium takeover activity and of the
price, q, of targets.
The supply of targets.–Let us start oﬀ by assuming as a constraint something
that will later emerge as an equilibrium action; namely, that, before it can be taken
over, a ﬁrm must certify that its z =1 . The total mass of potential targets is λ.T h e
act of certifying the quality of its project costs the ﬁrm c.I ft h eﬁrm does not wish
to be a target and if, instead, it were to manage its own project, its payoﬀ would be
x. Thus the direct plus the foregone-earnings costs of being a target are c+x. Thus,
at a price of q, the number of willing targets would be all the z =1ﬁrms for which
c + x is less than q. That number is
λF (q − c) ≡ S (q).
Evidently, S (q) is an upward sloping supply curve that is continuous if F is.
The demand for targets.–Any ﬁrm that drew a project z =0is a potential
acquirer. Unless it manages to acquire another ﬁrm, this ﬁr mf a c e sar e v e n u eo fz e r o .
The number of such ﬁrms is 1 − λ.I f ﬁrm x manages to buy another ﬁrm with a
certiﬁed z =1project, its revenue will be x. Thus, at a price of q,t h en u m b e ro f
willing acquirers would be the z =0ﬁrms for which x − q is positive. That number
is
(1 − λ)[1− F (q)] ≡ D(q),
a downward sloping demand curve.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium price of targets qE and number of takeovers TE,
where the two curves intersect. At q =0 ,a l lt h e1 − λ ﬁrms with z =0projects are
willing to buy, hence the demand curve cuts the horizontal axis at the point 1−λ.A s
q gets large, all the λ ﬁrms with z =1projects are willing to sell, and so the supply
curve approaches λ. Rents are split between the targets and the acquirers, with the
largest rents in each group going to the highest-x acquirers and the lowest-x targets.
Figure 1 relates to a stage of the game at which most of the uncertainty has been
resolved. It says nothing about bidder discounts and target premia. Here now is a
more precise account of the game.
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Figure 1: Supply and Demand for Targets
2.2 The ﬁve stages of the game
We shall treat all takeovers as cash sales although this is done purely for expositional
reasons. The dividends of the combined entity are then paid to the shareholders of
the acquiring ﬁrm. Shareholders are risk neutral and they hold on to their shares until
the ﬁrm pays its dividend and liquidates or until it is bought by another ﬁrm. We
assume that a manager acts in the shareholder’s interest. That is, he puts the ﬁrm up
for sale if the cash payment, q, exceeds his ﬁrm’s stand-alone dividend. Alternatively,
the manager buys another ﬁrm if the dividend he can secure his original shareholders
net of the cash paid for the acquired ﬁrm, exceeds his ﬁrm’s stand-alone dividend.
Events occur in ﬁve stages:
1. Firms form. Based on its x (which is public knowledge) each ﬁrm is sold at its
Stage-1 price p(x).
2. The ﬁrm privately observes z.I tm a y( t h r u t h f u l l y )d i s c l o s ei t sz to everyone at
ac o s tc.3
3In reality there is a whole set of indicators of project quality, and each of them probably carries
ad i ﬀerent c.G r a yet al (1990, Table 1) report 33 of them. Firms seem to favor disclosing of their
major new products and major capital expenditure projects in progress, but do not favor disclosing
their major patents.
43. Firm may enter the takeover market as a buyer or a seller.4
4. Based on its Stage-2 and Stage-3 choices, the ﬁrm’s price takes on its “Stage-4”
level. (It is to this stage that Figure 1 relates)
5. The ﬁrm pays its dividend and liquidates.
2.3 Stage-3 actions and Stage-4 prices
Equilibrium.–Key to equilibrium is a pair of real numbers, x0,a n dx1,w h e r ex0 <x 1.
These two numbers divide the set of x’s into three regions — top, middle, and bottom.
Targets come from the bottom region, acquirers from the top region. Firms from the
middle region stay out of the takeover market. We start describing the equilibrium
with an account of the Stage-3 actions and Stage-4 prices of the ﬁr m si ne a c hr e g i o n .
The bottom region — x ≤ x0.–If such a ﬁrm draws z =1 , it discloses that fact. It
becomes a takeover target and sells at the price q. All targets sell at the same price.5
Firm x0 is indiﬀerent between disclosing z (and getting its shareholders a payoﬀ of
q−c), and not disclosing and managing its own project (and getting its shareholders
ap a y o ﬀ of x0). That is,
q − c = x0. (3)
If such a ﬁrm does not disclose its z, the market rationally infers that any ﬁrm with
x<x 0 that has not disclosed is a z =0ﬁrm. The Stage-4 price of such a ﬁrm is
zero. To sum up, then, in the bottom region, a ﬁrm’s Stage-4 price is q if z =1 ,a n d
it is zero if z =0 .
The middle region — x ∈ (x0,x 1).–Such a ﬁrm does not disclose its z and it does
not bid for other ﬁrms. The market infers nothing from its inaction. If such a ﬁrm
has z =1 , it can guarantee its shareholders more than q − c, and it would refuse
(and successfully repel) any takeover bid at the price q. If, on the other hand, such
a ﬁrm has z =0 , buying another ﬁrm at the price q would leave it with a negative
net payoﬀ.T h u s , i f a ﬁrm from this region did not refuse a takeover bid, it would
reveal itself to be a “lemon”. Thus no one bids for ﬁrms in this region and their prices
remain unchanged at λx.
4I.e., a ﬁrm can repel an unwanted bid. Of all takeover bids, only 8.3% of all bids are hostile and
only 4.4% eventually succeed (Andrade et al, 2001). We do not explain such mergers.
5Strictly speaking, disclosure should occur before the takeovers announcement. Certainly the
price of the target-to-be does rise a bit before the takeover announcement (Pound and Zeckhouser
1990). Firms must, in fact, disclose business plans and other trade secrets at the IPO stage, and
when taking out patents. Many ﬁrms are taken over during the several months’ waiting period
b e t w e e na nI P Oﬁling and SEC approval. Some are taken over precisely for their intellectual prop-
erty, i.e., their patents. The direct costs of such disclosures may be small, but they may help the
ﬁrm’s competitors and any proﬁts thus foregone should also be a part of c. Firms seem to regard
‘competitive disadvantage’ as the largest part of c (Gray et al 1990, Table 4).
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Figure 2: Stage-4 Prices
The top region — x ≥ x1.–A ﬁrm that has drawn z =0has spare capacity in its
organization capital x that it will seek to employ. Such a ﬁrm buys a discloser from
the ﬁrst region thereby raising its own output and dividend from zero to x; and its
Stage-4 price is x − q. The lowest-quality bidder x1 is indiﬀerent between bidding
(and getting a payoﬀ of x1 −q), and managing its own project (and getting zero), so
that
q = x1. (4)
If it does not bid, this signals to the market that the ﬁrm’s z =1 ,a n di t sS t a g e - 4
price is x.
Why don’t the z =0ﬁrms refrain from bidding and thereby secure a jump in
their price? Because it then would deliver a zero dividend to its shareholders who are
following a “buy and hold” strategy.6 To sum up, then, in the top region, a ﬁrm’s
Stage-4 price is x if z =1 ,a n dx − q if z =0 . These Stage-4 prices are depicted by
heavy lines in Figure 2. In the middle region there is just one heavy line because, at
stage-4, the market cannot distinguish the good ﬁrms from the lemons. In the other
two regions, the actions of the ﬁrms have fully revealed their type.
The discontinuities in the price-functions of Figure 2 are misleading; the share-
holders of the good ﬁrms receive a continuous payoﬀ as we raise x, and so do the
shareholders of the bad ﬁrms. The situation is illustrated in Figure 3. Now the gains
6If enough shareholders were to sell their shares at Stage 4, and if the manager wanted to
maximize interim shareholder utility, he would refrain from bidding and masquerade as z =1ﬁrms.
Other shareholder holding strategies may induce z =0ﬁrms to not bid.
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Figure 3: How Equilibrium Dividends Depend on x and z
to trade are apparent; in the absence of takeovers, the z =1ﬁrms would be paying
their shareholders a dividend of x (i.e., the 450 line), and the z =0ﬁrms would be
paying their shareholders a dividend of zero (i.e., the horizontal axis). But what we
end up with is a Pareto improvement, with the targets and the bidders doing strictly
better than they would if there were no trade.
Market clearing.–The Stage-4 prices must guarantee that the takeover market
clears, i.e., that the demand for targets equals their supply:
λF (q − c)=( 1− λ)(1− F [q]) (5)
so that we are at an intersection of the two curves in Figure 1.
2.4 Stage-1 prices, p(x)
For ﬁrms in the middle region the Stage-1 prices are the same as the Stage-4 prices,
namely, λx. In the two other regions, a ﬁrm’s Stage-1 price is a weighted sum of the
prices it will fetch at stage 4, the weights being the probabilities of z b e i n gz e r oa n d





λ(q − c) if x ≤ x0,
λx if x ∈ (x0,x 1),
λx +( 1− λ)(x − q) if x ≥ x1.
(6)
Since there are no aggregate shocks, the value of the stock market as a whole is the
same at Stage 4 as it is at Stage 1. But the dispersion of prices is higher at Stage 4.
72.5 Existence of a positive-takeover equilibrium
Trade in ﬁrms stems from diﬀerences in comparative and absolute advantage in man-
agement, i.e., from the dispersion in x’s. Let xmin be the smallest and xmax the largest
value of x in the support of F. If the range of x is larger than c,t a k e o v e r sw i l lt a k e
place in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Existence) If F is continuous, if 0 <λ<1,a n di f
c<x max − xmin, (7)
then takeovers do occur in equilibrium,
x1 = x0 + c (8)
and q ∈ (c,xmax) uniquely solves
λF (q − c)=( 1− λ)(1− F [q]). (9)
Proof. Solving (3) for q and substituting into (4) implies that if equilibrium
exists, (8) must hold. Eq’s (3), (4), and (5) imply (9). It remains to be shown that,
for each λ and c, (9) has a unique solution for q. This follows in 2 steps: (i) at
q = xmax the RHS of (9) is zero whereas, by (7), the left-hand side of (9) is strictly
positive and (ii) at q = c the opposite is true. Since the LHS of (9) is continuous and
increasing in q w h e r e a st h eR H Si sc o n t i n u o u sa nd decreasing, we are done.
2.6 Comparative statics
The parameters of the model are c, λ,a n dF. The conditions of the existence theorem
provide clues to how the solution changes when the parameters change. Condition (7)
emphasized that takeovers are driven by the dispersion of x’s, summarized by their
range — no takeovers can occur if (7) fails. But the theorem also requires that there be
dispersion in the z’s; if all ﬁr m sh a dt h es a m e - q u a l i t yp r o j e c t s( w h i c hw o u l dh a p p e n
if λ =0or λ =1 ) , again there would be no takeovers. The number of equilibrium
takeovers is therefore non-monotonic in λ. Finally, takeover activity declines with c.







When λ is high, there are more good projects in total and the demand for targets
falls relative to their supply and, hence, so does q. On the other hand, when it costs
more to disclose quality, the price of targets will rise so as to reﬂe c tt h a tf a c t .E q ’ s















this latter because we just established that the number of takeovers, which also equals
λF (x0), decreases with c.
2.7 Discounts and premia
At Stage 4, all targets trade at a premium over their Stage-1 prices, and all bidders
trade at a discount. We measure the premia and discounts as percentages of Stage-1
prices p(x).
The target premium.–From (6), the premium is
(q − c) − p(x)
p(x)
=






and it is the same for all targets. The target premium is high when good projects are
scarce and when, as a result, a disclosure that z =1is especially good news. Since
target premia are on average about 0.2, the relevant value seems to be λ ≈ 0.83.
The bidder discount.–Conversely, the bidder discount is high when good projects
are plentiful and when, as a result, the revelation of z =0that is implicit in a ﬁrm’s
decision to acquire another, is especially bad news. The discount is smaller for the
high-x bidders because all bidders pay the same price, q, but the high-x bidders




x − (1 − λ)q
.
From (4) x1 = q,a n ds oδ(x1)=1 ; the marginal bidder loses all of his value. As x
rises, the discount steadily shrinks and converges to zero as x gets large.
The values combined.–The target’s x’s do not aﬀect their prices at any stage.
Therefore only the acquirer’s x aﬀects the sum of the two ﬁrms’ Stage-1 and Stage-4
prices. Relative to the sum of the two ﬁrms’ ex-ante values, the ex-post “joint” value
of the merged ﬁrm is
J (x)=
x − c
q(2λ − 1) + (x − λc)
, (13)
an expression that is relevant for x ≥ x1 only. The next proposition reports a result
that we shall use later: For λ ≥ 1/2, the joint values drop:7






λx +( 1− λ)(x − x1)
.
At x = x1, this is the same as the target premium, and it goes to zero as x gets large.
9Proposition 2 (Joint values). For any c, J (x) is strictly increasing in x if λ ≥
1/2 and
J (x) < 1 for all (c,x) and all λ ≥ 1/2. (14)
Proof. The ﬁrst claim follows immediately from (13). As for (14), the right-hand
side of (13) is less than unity when λ =1 /2 and it is even smaller when λ>1/2
because q>0.
Since it does not involve x, (14) applies to the joint value of all takeovers. The
drop is smaller for the high-x ﬁrms.
In all cases, including those in which the joint value drops, the merger raises the
joint output of the two ﬁrms by an amount xA −xT where xA is the acquirer’s x and
xT is the target’s x.
2.8 Takeovers and exits
Takeover activity is often measured by the value of the targets as a fraction of stock-
market capitalization.8 The total spent on takeovers is qλF (x0), and so the capital-
ization of targets relative to total capitalization is
m =
qλF (x0) R ∞
0 p(x)dF (x)
. (15)
Another interesting statistic is the fraction of exits — ﬁrms that end up not producing
output for reasons other than that they are taken over. In the model, such ﬁrms
are those whose z is zero and whose x is below x1. The number of such ﬁrms is
(1 − λ)F (x1), but their Stage-4 value is zero. Relative to the stock market, the











We shall calculate m and ε in the following example.
2.9 Example: Uniformly distributed x
We brieﬂy show the kinds of statistics that a model of this general type can gener-
ate. We choose λ so as to ﬁt the target premium of 0.2, and then ask what other
quantitative implications this has.
Assume that F (x)=x; i.e., x uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then (9) reads
λ(q − c)=( 1− λ)(1− q)
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Figure 4: δ(x) when λ =0 .83 and c =0
so that
q = x1 =1− λ(1 − c) and x0 =( 1− λ)(1− c)




x − (1 − λ)
2.
In the rest of this section we assume that λ =0 .83 so that our model ﬁts the target
premium or 0.20. Using this value of λ,w ep l o tδ(x) in Figure 4.
The bidder discount is an order of magnitude too large, especially at the lower
values of x. In section 4 we show how this quantitative error can be ﬁxed by allowing
a larger span of control for managers. The joint premium J,a sx ranges over the set
of possible bidder-types x ∈ [1 − λ,1], is
J (x)=
x
x +( 1− λ)(2λ − 1)
.
Taking the value λ =0 .83 under which the model ﬁts the target premium, we plot
J (x) in Figure 5.
The model also overpredicts J (x) in the negative direction. In Section 4.1, we also
show that raising managerial span of control can push J (x) t o w a r d s ,a n de v e na b o v e
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Figure 5: The ratio of post-bid joint values to the pre-bid joint values when λ =0 .83
and c =0 .
Still assuming c =0 , the value of each target is q =1− λ =0 .17,w h e r e a st h e
capitalization of the average acquirer is −q + E (x | x ≥ 0.17) = 0.42. Therefore the
capitalization of the average acquirer is 2.5 times that of the average target. In fact,
this ratio is somewhere between 5 and 10 (Andrade et al Table 1). This the model can
easily handle once we raise the managerial span of control as we explain in Section 4.
On the other hand, when λ =0 .83,m=0 .049, which slightly overpredicts the
relative capitalization of targets (0.025) during the period 1970-2000, and ε =0 .008,
which is about 2.3 times lower than the relative capitalization of non-acquired ﬁrms
(0.019) that de-listed from NYSE and Nasdaq since 1970.9
How much value do takeovers add? In other words, how much more output do we
have compared to the case in which takeovers are not allowed? Without takeovers,





Maximal output with takeovers occurs when c =0 , and, from (17) below, it is







As a fraction of the no-takeover output, the maximal gain is 0.486−0.415
0.415 =0 .17.
3W e l f a r e
Our welfare measure is net aggregate output, Y . If agents could not recontract
from the Stage-2 random assignment of z to x, aggregate output would be λµx ≡
9Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002).
12λ
R ∞
0 xdF (x). With takeovers, however, output net of disclosure costs becomes






(c + x)dF (17)
This is how much could be produced if, at a cost c, the planner could truthfully elicit
all the z =1from ﬁrms with x<x 0, and reassign them to ﬁrms with x>x 1.I t
turns out that the equilibrium maximizes Y with respect to x0 and x1, subject to the
resource constraint
λF (x0)=( 1− λ)[1− F (x1)]
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium Maximizes Y ). The equilibrium allocations maximize
Y. Moreover, when c ∈ (0,x max − xmin),
dY
dc
= −λF (x0) < 0.
Proof. The Lagrangian is
L = Y + θ{λF (x0) − (1 − λ)[1− F (x1)]}
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
−(c + x0)+θ =0
and
−x1 + θ =0
The second-order derivatives with respect to x0 and x1 a r en e g a t i v ea n dt h ec r o s s
partials are zero. Therefore L is globally strictly concave in the vector (x0,x 1).
Combining the two conditions and observing that the constraint must hold proves
the ﬁrst claim. The second claim then follows from the envelope theorem. The strict
inequality follows from Proposition 1 (eq. [9]) by which F (x0) > 0.
So, if the planner must pay c for every discovery of a z =1ﬁrm, then the
equilibrium also maximizes aggregate output net of disclosure costs, much as one
would expect based on Figure 1. In this sense, then, equilibrium is constrained
eﬃcient.
As c → 0,x 0 and x1 tend to the same value, call it x∗ which solves the equation
λF (x)=( 1− λ)(1− F [x]),
Letting x∗ denote the optimum and simplifying,
F (x
∗)=1− λ. (18)
13so that the number of projects reassigned, λF (x∗), is just λ(1 − λ). This is also
the ﬁrst-best level of takeovers because this is what a planner could attain if he had
knowledge of the z’s without having to bear the disclosure costs.
The welfare properties of equilibrium seem to be unrelated to the change in the
joint total value of the bidder and the target (Proposition 2) — takeovers are always
associated with a level of output that exceeds λµx regardless of what δ(x) and J (x)
happen to be. This is because without aggregate risk, all future welfare gains from
reassignment are already included in p(x).
4E x t e n s i o n s
In this section we relax some of the assumptions and look into some other implications
of the model.
4.1 Larger span of control
Suppose that a manager can handle up to n projects, and that the production function





To keep things simple, each manager is still endowed with just one project to begin
with. Take the case where c =0 . Then there are just 2 regions, i.e., x0 = x1 ≡
ˆ x. Bidders in the region where x ≥ ˆ x wish to acquire n ﬁrms if their endowed
p r o j e c ti sb a d ,a n dn − 1 ﬁrms if their endowed project is good. (5) reads λF (ˆ x)=
n(1 − λ)(1− F [ˆ x]) + (n − 1)λ(1 − F [ˆ x]),o rs i m p l y
λ = n(1 − F [ˆ x])
Conditions (3) and (4) are unchanged and therefore













rises with n, because the best managers now have a wider span of control.
Thus modiﬁed, the model now yields a smaller bidder’s discount — roughly by
af a c t o ro f1/n. That is because only 1/nth of a ﬁrm’s eventual operations have a
quality that is in doubt at Stage 1. The remaining n − 1 projects will, after the
14takeover market has cleared, all be of quality z =1 ,a n dt h eﬁrm’s Stage-1 price,
p(x) will reﬂect that fact. The target premium is not aﬀected, however, because a
ﬁrm for which x<ˆ x still becomes a target with probability 1 and so for such a ﬁrm,
p(x)=λx as before.
4.2 Pooling equilibria
Pooling equilibria exist when c is high. In such an equilibrium, targets do not disclose
anything, and the acquirer is not sure what z he is getting. Acquirers come from the
top region, as before, but the logic behind (4) now implies that
λx1 − q =0 (19)
The equilibrium still has three regions, ﬁrms with x<x 0 disclose nothing and sell
for the price of q. Again a middle set (x0,x 1) exists where ﬁrms do not disclose and
no one bids for them. Firms with x<qmust not want to repel, and therefore
x0 = q (20)
which, of course, is the same as (3). It is the xmax ﬁrm that cares the most about
having a z =1project to manage for sure. Its expected gain from being sure of
having a good project would be (1 − λ)xmax.Aﬁrm that disclosed that it had z =1
could therefore extract from the bidder at most (1 − λ)xmax. Therefore, under no
circumstance would any ﬁrm disclose if the following condition held:
c>(1 − λ)xmax (21)
Thus we have
Proposition 4 (Pooling Equilibrium) If (21) holds, a pooling equilibrium exists
in which x0, x1,a n dq satisfy (19), (20), and (5). Moreover, when
c>x max − xmin, (22)
the pooling equilibrium is unique.
When x is bounded and λ is relatively close to unity, there are values of c for which
both equilibria exist.10 Such an equilibrium does not entail any spending on disclo-
sure, and projects do ﬂow towards better managers, though at a rate smaller than
the ﬁrst-best level x∗. Hence, takeovers raise total output. The pooling equilibrium
entails bidder discounts, but no target premia.
10As in Jovanovic (1982), a coexistence of disclosure and pooling regions appears to be a possibile
equilibrium for some parameter values, but these, too, disappear when xmax →∞ .
15This equilibrium is of little interest because (21) is not likely to hold practice:
payments made to investment banks and other certiﬁers of quality at the takeover
stage amount to at most a percent or two of target value. Even if we add to c the cost
of leaking trade secrets to competitors, c should still be far smaller than the RHS of
(21). To see this, consider once more the case in which x is uniformly distributed, as
in Section 2.9. The RHS of (21) is 1−λ, which also happens to be the gross value of
the target. Hence, the disclosure costs have to be comparable with the total value of
the target in order for the pooling equilibrium to exist.
4.3 Correlated x and z
For takeovers to arise at Stage 4, some good managers must, at stage 2, have drawn
bad projects. If, instead of being constant, the probability of drawing a good projects
were to rise with x, the fraction of bad matches would fall. Let
Pr{z =1| x} ≡ λ(x),
where λ





a more positive slope of λ(x) would (a) raise the Stage-2 correlation between x and z
and, hence, reduce the number of takeovers, activity, and, (b) raise the target premia
and the bidder discounts. Intuitively, this would be because z =1would now be a
bigger positive surprise for a low-x ﬁrm, and z =0w o u l db ea ne v e nb i g g e rn e g a t i v e
surprise for a high-x ﬁrm.
4.4 Market for x
Since x is that part of a ﬁrm that is common knowledge, why would there be no market
for x? Indeed, if we do assume that x is some attribute of the ﬁrm’s human capital,
there in fact is a market for x — the labor market — that our model assumes does
not function. Suppose, for the moment, that x is something that the ﬁrm actually
owns and not, as is the case with human capital, something that it rents. A low-x
ﬁrm with a z =1could buy a higher x from a ﬁrm that has z =0 .S i n c ex is public
knowledge, no disclosure would be needed, and the equilibrium would have x0 = x1,
with (1 − λ)(1− F [x1]) units of x moving from the high-x ﬁrms with z =0projects
to the λF (x0) low-x ﬁrms with z =1projects. Finally, total output in (17) would
correspond to its level when x0 = x1 and c =0 .
Why, then, is this a model of the takeover market, and not a model of a market
for one of the ﬁrms’ components, namely x? The answer must be that human capital
is costly to move from ﬁrm to ﬁrm, specially when it is speciﬁc to a team. Most of
16what we call “ﬁrm-speciﬁc” human capital is probably tied to the group of workers
employed by that ﬁr m . I ft h ew h o l et e a mw e r et om o v et oa n o t h e rﬁrm — this
sometimes happens on Wall Street when an entire team of analysts moves from one
investment bank to another — this capital would be just as useful in the new ﬁrm as it
was in the old one. And yet we would call this human capital ﬁrm speciﬁc precisely
because it is virtually impossible for a large team to move to another ﬁrm and stay
intact unless the new ﬁrm literally is right across the street. Prescott and Visscher
(1980) call such capital organization capital, and they describe the costs of creating
it.
To sum up, we intend x to stand for an asset that ﬁr m sh a v eu s e df o raw h i l e ,
the expertise of a team that has managed projects in the past and that have learned
to function well as a unit. When the team ﬁnds itself with spare capacity, instead of
dispersing, it will look for takeover opportunities. Gort, Grabowski, and McGuckin
(1985) also argued this.
4.5 The Q-theory of takeover investment
The model is a version of the Q-theory of takeover investment, in that projects tend
to move from low-Q ﬁrms to high-Q ﬁrms. By a ﬁrm’s Q we mean the ratio of the
Stage-1 market value of the ﬁrm, p(x), to the ‘replacement’ value of its ‘capital’.
Recall that a ﬁrm cannot replace its x,o n l yi t sz, and so we think of the ﬁrm’s
tangible capital as its z —t h i si sw h a taﬁrm can ‘replace’.
Let pz denote the Stage-1 replacement cost of an unscreened z. Then the Stage-1





Since pz is common to all ﬁrms, we have
Proposition 5 Acquirers have higher Q’s than do the targets
Proof. From (6), for x<x 0, Q(x)= 1
pzλ(q − c). But (6) and (4) imply that
Q(x1)= 1
pzλq. That is, the lowest-Q acquirer has at least as high a Q as does any
target. And, since Q is strictly increasing in x for x>x 1, t h es a m ei st r u ef o ra n y
acquirer.
Am e r g e rraises the joint output of the two ﬁrms by an amount xA−xT where xA is
the acquirer’s x and xT is the target’s x.S i n c eQ is increasing in x,t h i st r a n s l a t e si n t o
the statement that joint gains should be higher and joint losses smaller for mergers
in which QA−QT is high. Lang, Stultz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) ﬁnd
that the mergers that create the most value are those between high-Q bidders and
low-Q targets, which is consistent with Proposition 5.
175 Relation to the literature
Holmes and Schmitz (1990, 1995) study the transfer of businesses through sale rather
than takeover. In their 1990 model, good managers acquire ﬁrms from good devel-
opers of new ideas. And in their 1995 model, whether a ﬁrm stands alone, sells its
business or exits depends on the quality of the ﬁrm, and on the quality of the match
between the entrepreneur (manager) and his ﬁrm. A manager of a high quality busi-
ness to which he is poorly matched will sell that business, while a manager who is
matched badly to a low-quality ﬁrm will exit. In our model, by contrast, a good
m a n a g e ri sb e t t e ra tm a n a g i n gany project and, if his ﬁrm does not have a good
project, he will look to acquire one that does. In the Holmes and Schmitz model,
low-quality managers sell their businesses to new entrants. So, in their models, as in
ours, who manages what ﬁrm depends entirely on fundamentals.
McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) study a ﬁrm that contemplates entering a new
market. It can do this on its own, or, instead it can bid for one of the incumbents. A
takeover bid reveals weak internal investment opportunities and leads to a reduction
in the bidder’s stock price even though the takeover has a positive value for the bidder.
The target’s price rises because a takeover removes the threat of direct entry, thus
raising the bargaining power of the targeted ﬁrm. Because it is the entrant that bids
for an incumbent, their model is better suited to conglomerate diversiﬁcation into an
oligopolistic market. Our model, by contrast, is better suited to horizontal mergers
because we assume that any manager can manage any ﬁrm’s project equally well.
The bidder discount in our model arrises for reasons similar to the discount that
arises upon an equity issue in Myers and Majluf (1984). Campa and Kedia (forthcom-
ing), Villalonga (2000) have argued that the so-called diversiﬁcation discount arises
purely because of selection bias. These notions go back to simultaneous equations
bias involving endogenous discrete variables as in Heckman (1978).
6C o n c l u s i o n
Initially we wanted to build an equilibrium model in which takeover targets experi-
enced jumps in price and acquirers experienced price declines. In the model, the sole
purpose of a takeover is to transfer a business project to a better manager. Although
quality of a project is assumed to be known only to the ﬁrm itself, to our surprise
the equilibrium turned out to be constrained-eﬃcient and, for reasonable parameter
values the joint value of the target and acquirer falls.
As Proposition 5 shows, this is a version of the Q-theory of investment. The
pre-announcement Q’s of the acquirers exceed those of the targets. Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002) ﬁnd that such a model helps explains some of the takeover invest-
ment, although it cannot explain all of it. We noted a few other explanations in the
introduction and there may, indeed, be several reasons for takeovers. We have shown
18that the facts on Q can be explained by a model in which takeovers improve eﬃciency,
even though stock prices react negatively to their announcements.
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